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 The Judge, the Occupier, his Laws, and their Validity: 
Judicial Review by the Supreme Courts of Occupied Belgium, 
Norway, and the Netherlands 1940-1945 in the Context of their 
Professional Conduct and the Consequences for their Public Image 
Derk Venema1 
Introduction 
Under the German occupation in World War II, the supreme courts of the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway were forced to form an opinion on the 
relation between the occupier’s ordinances on the one hand and domestic and 
international law on the other. The overall attitudes of these three supreme 
courts towards the occupier are reflected in this one topic: their positions and 
decisions concerning judicial review of the occupier’s ordinances. For each 
court, I will give an outline of its behaviour and its own justifications and 
discuss the consequences of these for their public image. The three case 
studies will lead to a tentative conclusion about which were the most 
important factors leading to a positive or a negative image. 
The International Law of Belligerent Occupation 
Central to the legal relation between occupier and occupied territory is 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (HR) of 1907. This article still serves as 
the basis of the international law of occupation, and is clarified, but essentially 
unaltered by Article 64 of the 4th Geneva Convention of 19492. It defines the 
position of any occupying regime as follows: “The authority of the legitimate 
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall 
take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, 
public order and civil life, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the 
laws in force in the country3”. The two main problems of interpretation and 
application, already experienced in the First World War, concern “public 
 
1
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2
 Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2009, p. 110-111 (no. 258). Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
war on Land annexed to Hague Convention (II) of 1899 and Hague Convention (IV) of 1907. 
The text of the Hague Regulations, as that of the Geneva Conventions, is available on the 
International Red Cross website humanitarian law database: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf.  
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order and civil life” and “unless absolutely prevented”. The first phrase is not 
very specific, to say the least. Occupiers and occupied have had very different 
ideas about which matters should be under the occupier’s control and 
regulation. Therefore “public order and civil life” can acquire a very different 
content in either party’s interpretation because it leaves a large measure of 
discretion to occupiers and judges in the occupied territory. The problem 
probably seemed less serious at the time HR Article 43 was framed. The 
1907 wording is almost identical to Articles 2 and 3 of the Brussels 
Declaration drafted at the Brussels Peace Conference in 18744. The period 
1874-1907 was a time when society was not nearly as extensively regulated 
and meticulously organised and administrated by governments as it is today, 
although social legislation was upcoming. “Maintaining public order and civil 
life” could at that time be understood as a minimalist version of the nineteenth 
century minimal state. Occupations were expected to last not more than a few 
months, in which period the occupier would have the task of keeping society 
running without making many or significant changes until the end of the war, 
at which point it would be decided by peace treaty who would rule the country 
in question from that point onwards. This would enable a returning lawful 
government to more or less continue where it had left off, without having to 
deal with a completely changed state-organisation5. 
Less than a decade after the Hague Regulations were finalised, the First 
World War showed their flaws: occupiers, notably the German regime in 
Belgium, interpreted Article 43 in ways unforeseen and in its own interest, 
against the interests of the Belgian state and population6. Also, in order to 
uphold public order and civil life, it appeared impossible for the occupier to 
abstain from making major changes to the administration of an occupied 
country during a “total” war, lasting years and not months, and thoroughly 
disrupting society and the economy7. The same holds true for the Second 
World War occupations. This meant that in these circumstances the occupier’s 
governmental task according to international law could not be as minimal as 
the terms “public order” and “civil life” suggest. 
As a consequence, long-term occupations made the need felt for judicial 
review of an occupier’s measures during the occupation, and not just 
 
4
 Arthur Eyffinger, The 1899 Hague peace conference, “The parliament of man, the federation 
of the world”, The Hague, Kluwer, 1999, p. 259-261. 
5
 Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2004, p. 6. 
6
 Eyal Benvenisti, op.cit., p. 32-44, and his references to James Wilford Garner, International 
law and the World War, London, Longmans, Green and Co, 1921. 
7
 Eyal Benvenisti, op.cit., p. 33-34, 46, 47. 
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afterwards (the ius postliminium), because the effects were more profound and 
lasting than in short-term occupations. As there was, and still is, no 
independent inter- or supranational reviewing institution, the only officials 
possibly having the power to legally scrutinize an occupier’s ordinances are 
the judges of the occupied country’s courts. Whether occupiers are prepared 
to accept the outcome of those reviews, is a different question.  
Despite the disillusions of the First World War, no revision or extension of 
the Hague Regulations was undertaken, out of respect for the newly founded 
League of Nations, which the world hoped would solve future international 
conflicts and prevent wars. The Second World War disillusioned these hopes. 
Under German occupation, the question of judicial review of ordinances 
issued by the occupying regime in the light of HR Article 43 unavoidably 
emerged. As there was no rule of international law regarding judicial review 
by national courts, state practices were ambiguous8. In the next sections, I will 
discuss the most important court decisions in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Norway concerning the judicial review of the German occupier’s legislative 
measures, in the context of their professional conduct in general.  
The Dutch Hoge Raad  
Because Hitler viewed the Dutch as a Germanic Brudervolk, he chose to 
establish a civilian occupation administration instead of a mere military 
regime. This was meant as a favour: the Germans thought that their westerly 
neighbours might be persuaded to convert to National Socialism, for which 
cause a purely military occupation would probably seem too oppressive. As a 
part of this strategy, the Dutch ministries were left intact. This meant that, the 
Queen and her cabinet having fled to London, the secretaries-general of each 
ministry (the highest Dutch civil servants) became acting ministers. They had 
to answer to four German Generalkommissare who in turn were led by 
Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart. The Reichskommissar delegated 
legislative powers to his Generalkommissare and to the secretaries-general, 
who from that moment on enjoyed more extensive powers than their former 
ministers9. 
 
8
 According to F. Morgenstern, “Validity of the acts of the belligerent occupant”, British 
Yearbook of International Law (28) 1951, p. 291, 303, the Dutch Hoge Raad stood “virtually 
alone” in denying competency to review. Benvenisti, however, states that in many German 
occupied countries, judges refrained from reviewing: Eyal Benvenisti, op.cit., p. 192-196. 
9
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The German civil administration formulated their powers in the terms of HR 
Article 43: the first three German ordinances emphasized the tasks of 
restoring and protecting “public order and civil life” with respect for Dutch 
law10. The intent to adhere to the Hague Regulations with regard to the 
occupation of Holland was even published in the Frankfurter Zeitung11. On 
the other hand, German army and SS officers were less inclined to be 
persuaded by arguments of international law. The chief of the German 
occupying forces, General Friedrich Christiansen, famously held that 
“International Law exists only in newspapers”, and a member of the SS 
declared that “we determine [the content of] International Law”12. Formally, 
however, the occupier’s legislative powers were based on, and limited by, the 
Hague Regulations, as were the legislative powers of the Dutch secretaries-
general, as these were derived from the occupier’s powers.  
At an early stage of the occupation, the Hoge Raad (the Dutch Supreme 
Court) took a devastating blow, with the Germans dismissing its president, 
L.E. Visser, because he was a Jew. By appointing a much more cooperative 
successor, the occupier succeeded in frustrating any unanimous protest by the 
Hoge Raad as an institution. Later, more deutschfreundliche and even Nazi-
sympathetic justices were appointed, further decreasing the court’s ability to 
take a stand against the occupier. 
Faced with an all-powerful occupier, the question arose whether Dutch judges 
had the legal power to review ordinances promulgated by the occupation 
regime in the light of HR Article 43 when specifically requested in a court 
case. In several newspaper and law review articles in 1940 and 1941 this right 
was negated by prominent Dutch jurists. They even acclaimed the good 
cooperation with the occupier, praising his respect for the international law of 
occupation13. Importantly, this was before it became fully apparent that the 
German occupier was planning to turn Holland into a national-socialist state, 
 
Reichskommissariat Niederlande: Versuch und Scheitern nationalsozialistischer Neuordnung, 
Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968, Ch. 3.  
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 Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, ordinances 1/1940 - 3/1940. 
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 X, “Occupatio bellica”, Frankfurter Zeitung 4 July 1940, p. 3. 
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 Derk Venema, Rechters in oorlogstijd. De confrontatie van de Nederlandse rechterlijke 
macht met nationaal-socialisme en bezetting, Den Haag, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2007 (full 
text: http://hdl.handle.net/2066/37572, including a summary in English), p. 183. 
13
 Articles by the international law specialists Prof. B.M. Telders and Prof. V.H. Rutgers, 
published in the collection of Dutch sources and texts on the matter of judicial review during 
the German occupation: Derk Venema, Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, Thomas Mertens (ed.), 
Onder de huidige omstandigheden. De Hoge Raad en het Toetsingsarrest 1942, Den Haag, 
Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2008. See also Job de Ruiter, Jan Donner jurist, Amsterdam, 
Boom, 2003, p. 191-196. 
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exploit its economy and exterminate its Jews. These lawyers assumed that 
loyal cooperation would ensure that the Germans would stay within 
international legal boundaries and that they would continue their relatively 
benign administration of occupied Holland. An illegal brochure by an 
international lawyer and an extensive internal report by a member of the Hoge 
Raad, both in 1941, also stated that review was not possible, nor wise, during 
the occupation14. 
From the beginning of the occupation, Dutch courts applied decrees of the 
German and Dutch authorities without reviewing them. This attitude was 
probably the result of the judiciary’s faith and hope that the Germans would 
keep their rule within the limits of international law, as they had generally 
done in 1940 and 194115. The first, and last, case before a Dutch court 
involving a final decision on the question of review against the Hague 
Regulations was the infamous Toetsingsarrest (“Judicial Review Case”) by 
the Hoge Raad of 12 January 194216. In this case, the appellant requested the 
review of the ordinance establishing the special economic courts that had 
convicted him. The exact question was whether the economic court system 
had really been a necessity in order to protect “public order and civil life”. In 
other words: was the occupation administration “absolutely prevented” from 
using solely existing Dutch law and courts to fight economic crime? The 
procureur-generaal (Procurator General), who gives advisory opinions to the 
Hoge Raad, was of the opinion that the Dutch government would have done 
the same if the country had not been occupied, as the economic crime rate had 
exploded and the ordinary criminal courts were overloaded with cases. 
Moreover, he did not even consider the creation of economic courts an 
infringement on Dutch law, which rendered judicial review unnecessary.  
The Hoge Raad found a different way around reviewing, ruling that “[t]he 
Netherlands courts are not allowed to put a wet [‘statute’, meaning Dutch 
legislation as well as the occupier’s ordinances] to the test of a treaty like […] 
 
14
 Gezina Hermina Johanna van der Molen, Bezettingsrecht, 1941 (illegal brochure), published 
in Derk Venema, Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, Thomas Mertens (ed.), op.cit., as well as the 
internal Supreme Court report. 
15
 The German occupier took care to prevent Dutch courts handling any cases concerning the 
marginalisation of the Jews. Derk Venema, Rechters in oorlogstijd…, §4.4.4. 
16
 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 12 January 1942, Annual Digest of Public International 
Law Cases (AD) 1947 (supplementary volume 1919-1942), case 161, with notes by J.H.W. 
Verzijl. Also published in: Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1942/271; Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 1942-1943, p. 592-599. 
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the Hague Regulations […]”17. Under normal circumstances, however, Dutch 
legislation could be reviewed against treaty law18. Therefore, the extension of 
this supposed prohibition to the occupier’s ordinances (which the court rightly 
considered “under the circumstances” to be valid Dutch law) was not 
convincing from a strictly legal point of view. The other arguments were not 
very compelling either: “Neither the history nor the wording of HR Article 43 
affords any foundation for the assumption that the framers of the Convention 
intended to confer upon the courts which had remained in function in the 
occupied territory […] jurisdiction to judge the measures taken by the 
occupant […]”. Treaties never mention the power of domestic judges to 
review their country’s legislation for compliance with it. The Hoge Raad’s 
final argument was that parliament never even so much as considered a power 
of review in its discussion of the Hague Conventions. This does not provide 
evidence of the absence of the power to review either. When this judgment 
became known to the public, it was immediately heavily criticized. The Hoge 
Raad was reproached for not having taken the lead in making a stand against 
German injustices, thereby not taking its responsibility as the highest judicial 
authority seriously, and frustrating the people’s feeling of justice19. This 
remains the subject of heated debate20. 
The Germans, on the other hand, were pleased with this ruling, considering it 
a legitimation of their legislative policy, or at least a confirmation of its 
legality. The Dutch Nazi secretary-general of Justice referred to it in his 1944 
brochure on the occupation and the Hague Regulations21, and 
Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart used it in his defence at Nuremberg22. Only in 
non-public communication did the Hoge Raad protest against policies of the 
German regime, on some occasions referring to HR Article 43 and/or other 
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 Derk Venema, Rechters in oorlogstijd…, Ch. 3, deals with this Hoge Raad ruling 
extensively. See also Derk Venema, “Het Toetsingsarrest”, in Ars Aequi, 2009-12, p. 846-849. 
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Haag, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2004, p. 124-129. 
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 Letter of law professor R.P. Cleveringa to Hoge Raad justice P.A..J. Losecaat Vermeer 
25 October 1943, Derk Venema, Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, Thomas Mertens (ed.), op.cit., 
p. 77-78; Secret report of a commission of lawyers to the government in exile (ca. 1943), Derk 
Venema, Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, Thomas Mertens (ed.), op.cit., p. 129-130. 
20
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Groot-van Leeuwen, Thomas Mertens (ed.), op.cit. 
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1907, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1944, p. 16, also published in Derk Venema, Leny de Groot-van 
Leeuwen, Thomas Mertens (ed.), op.cit. 
22
 Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal 
sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1946-1951, Vol. 16, 
p. 5, 108-109; Vol. 19, p. 71-75, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp. 
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articles, as some other courts also did23. One justice was arrested and taken 
hostage twice for his involvement in the resistance activities of the Protestant 
church. He resigned shortly after returning to office the second time in 1944. 
A verdict by the Leeuwarden appeal court in 1943 dampened the German 
authorities’ enthusiasm for Dutch courts24. The Leeuwarden judges had 
lowered the prison sentence for a thief, thereby sparing him a stay in a 
detention camp near Ommen. This camp had been set up for lack of prison 
cells and was run by Dutch Nazi personnel who underfed and brutally 
assaulted the inmates. Many detainees were hospitalized and even died during 
their incarceration at Ommen. The appeal court not only mentioned the 
aggravated circumstances in the camp in justifying the lower sentence, but 
also stated that it did this “for conscience’s sake”. This was immediately 
understood as moral criticism directed towards the occupier’s policies in 
general. The Germans were infuriated and the responsible judges were given 
their notice. Ironically, the protest verdict endangered the closing of the camp, 
which had been prepared for months by a careful lobby of judges, Hoge Raad 
justices, and public prosecutors25. The resistance hailed the words of protest as 
an enormous relief after the Hoge Raad’s discouraging decision against 
judicial review26. 
Only on the verge of liberation did a Dutch judge dare to again mention 
judicial review in a ruling. In 1944, the Dutch lawyer A. Schenkeveld filed 
several suits for pharmacists against the Nazi “Pharmacists Chamber” that 
forced pharmacists to become members if they wished to continue their 
profession27. These organisations acted like the German Kulturkammer did 
towards artists (which had also been copied in Holland by the occupying 
authorities). The pharmacists demanded that the obligation to pay membership 
dues to the Chamber be ruled unlawful because of, amongst other things, a 
conflict of conscience. None of these cases was ever decided in a regular 
procedure, but at least seven court decisions in preliminary injunction 
 
23
 Corjo Jansen, Derk Venema, De Hoge Raad en de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Recht en 
rechtsbeoefening in de jaren 1930-1950, Amsterdam, Boom, 2011, Part II; Derk Venema, 
Rechters in oorlogstijd…, p. 222-223, 236, 280-281. 
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Herman Louis Christoffel Hermans, Om des gewetens wille. De geschiedenis van een arrest in 
oorlogstijd, Leeuwarden, Friese Pers Boekerij 2003. 
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 See for these cases: Jan Barendsen, “De rechtbank Arnhem en de Duitse bezetting”, in Jan 
Barendsen, Derk Venema (ed.), De rechtbank Arnhem en de Duitse bezetting, Nijmegen, Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2004, p. 33-73; Derk Venema Rechters in oorlogstijd…, p. 351-352 and §6.4. 
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proceedings were reached, five of which were published during the 
occupation. In five cases, the conflict of conscience was deemed legal ground 
for the suspension of the pharmacists’ obligation to pay dues to the 
Pharmacists Chamber. The most important ruling was made by judge F.J.M. 
van Nispen tot Sevenaer of Arnhem’s district court. The court stated it knew 
that “a great number of people have fundamental objections [to National 
Socialism]”. Moreover, it declared that the Pharmacists Chamber “does not 
serve any military interest”, is contrary to “the spirit of Dutch law”, and 
amounts to an “infringement on the freedom of conscience”. Schenkeveld also 
demanded that the court review the ordinance that had created the Chamber 
against HR Article 43. The two lawyers representing the Pharmacists 
Chamber, both of them members of the Dutch National Socialist Movement, 
argued that the court was under an obligation to follow the decision of the 
Hoge Raad in the Judicial Review Case. The court replied (in accordance with 
Dutch law) that it is not bound by precedent and added that the civil chamber 
of the Hoge Raad might well rule differently from the criminal chamber on 
the matter of judicial review. The plaintiff’s claim in this preliminary 
injunction proceeding was sustained because of the possibility that the 
Pharmacists Chamber Ordinance be ruled unlawful due to non-compliance 
with HR Article 43 by a judge in the regular proceedings28. 
On the same day as the Arnhem District Court ruling, 4 September 1944, the 
state of emergency was declared because of rumours of an Allied invasion. 
Two weeks later, the battle of Arnhem commenced, reducing the courthouse 
to ashes. This probably prevented the Germans from noticing the judgement 
and taking measures against the judge and the court. 
Very soon after liberation, the Hoge Raad defended it cooperation with the 
Germans in a lengthy pamphlet. This was immediately heavily criticised by 
lawyers in other pamphlets, with the justices being called outright 
collaborators who had cowardly surrendered to the enemy29. The government, 
the Queen and many resistance lawyers unsuccessfully tried to organize a 
purge of the Hoge Raad. In the end, only Nazi-appointed collaborators were 
prosecuted and no investigation was carried out into the conduct of the court 
as a whole. After a yearlong disagreement with the government all remaining 
 
28
 NJ 1944/1945, 653. 
29
 De Hooge Raad: antwoord aan Mr. N.C.M.A. van den Dries, Amsterdam, Vrij Nederland, 
1945, and C.M.O. van Nispen tot Sevenaer, Waarom de Hooge Raad faalde, een beschouwing 
naar aanleiding van Mr. van den Dries’ pleidooi voor “de Hooge Raad tijdens de bezetting”, 
Zutphen, Thieme, 1945, both published in Derk Venema, Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, Thomas 
Mertens (ed.), op cit. 
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pre-war appointees were allowed to resume their offices, to the bitter 
disappointment of many former resistance members. For decades the Hoge 
Raad’s maxim was “don’t mention the war” and would hear nothing of 
research into its wartime history. Only very recently did the court officially 
request a legal historian to write a monograph on this subject30.  
The conduct of the Belgian and Norwegian supreme courts has often been 
praised as examples of how the Hoge Raad should have behaved31. The next 
sections will show whether that corresponds with their reputations at home. 
The Belgian Cour de Cassation  
In contrast to the Netherlands, Belgium experienced two German occupations, 
and on both occasions the question of judicial review of the occupier’s 
ordinances was decided by the Belgian Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court)32. 
The first time, in 1916, the court ruled that Belgian judges were not competent 
to review them in the light of the Hague Regulations. Their main argument 
was that treaties were contracts between states and judges are not competent 
to “encroach upon the prerogative of the competent national power”33. Only 
after the occupation had ended could the former occupier be held liable for 
damages according to Article 3 of the Hague Convention IV. According to the 
Cour de Cassation, HR Article 43 gave the occupier full legislative authority, 
which entailed that his decrees were to be treated as Belgian Law.  
During the second German occupation, Belgium was not given a civilian 
occupation government until the Allies had almost reached the border. Until 
that moment, Alexander von Falkenhausen acted as chief of the military 
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 Resulting in Corjo Jansen, Derk Venema, op.cit. 
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 Letter of law professor R.P. Cleveringa to Hoge Raad justice P.A..J. Losecaat Vermeer 
25 October 1943, Derk Venema, Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, Thomas Mertens (ed.), op.cit., 
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International Law in Historical Perspective, Part IX-A, The Laws of War, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
1978, p. 202, 203; J.N.M.E. Michielsen, The “Nazification” and “Denazification” of the courts 
in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, The Belgian, Luxembourg and Netherlands 
Courts and their Reactions to Occupation Measures and Measures from their Governments 
Returning from Exile, Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2004, p. 202. 
(full text: http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=7890). 
32
 This paragraph is based on Corjo Jansen, Derk Venema, op. cit., Part 2, §5.2. For much of 
the following I am indebted to J.N.M.E. Michielsen, op.cit., Ch. 2. See also Werner 
Warmbrunn, The German Occupation of Belgium 1940-1945, New York, Peter Lang, 1993, 
Ch. III, esp. 104-124. 
33
 Cour de Cassation 20 May 1916. Cited according to International Law Notes 1916, p. 136, 
see Eyal Bevenisti, op.cit., p. 192-193. See also Pasicrisie Belge, 1916, p. 416-418. 
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administration. In the years of occupation, HR Article 43 played a more 
indirect role in judicial review by the Belgian courts. On the day of the 
German invasion, May 10, 1940, the Belgian government, like the Dutch, fled 
the country, but unlike the Dutch queen, the Belgian king did not leave. Just 
before the ministers took off, parliament enacted a statute delegating 
emergency legislative powers to the secretaries-general of the ministries. The 
Germans were quite content with this arrangement, because the military 
administration was not equipped to take on the task of civil legislator. Now 
they would not have to legislate as much themselves as they had had to during 
their previous occupation of Belgium, when there was no legislative authority 
left in the occupied country34. On 12 June the occupier reached an agreement 
with the secretaries-general and the judiciary on the administration of 
Belgium, laid down in the so-called “Protocol”: the measures of the German 
authorities would be executed like Belgian laws, so long as they did not 
transgress the boundaries set by the Hague Regulations, and the secretaries-
general would submit all their legislative measures to German scrutiny35. The 
important difference here is that the legislative powers of the Belgian 
secretaries-general were not derived from the occupier’s, as was the case in 
the Netherlands, but from the Belgian government36. 
The secretaries-general were not competent to create formal laws but only 
decrees (arrêtés) that were not immune to constitutional review, like formal 
laws were. The Cour de Cassation recognised this legislative power, and 
noted that the secretaries-general had the obligation to ensure, as part of the 
occupation regime, public order and public life according to HR Article 43, 
thereby ensuring that the administration of occupied Belgium would stay 
largely in the hands of Belgians who could keep it in accordance with Belgian 
law and Belgian institutions. Importantly, the Cour de Cassation left open the 
possibility that Belgian judges might review the decrees for compliance with 
the statute on delegation and with the Belgian constitution37.  
In its decision of 30 March 1942, the Cour de Cassation reviewed a decree 
creating a new economic administrative criminal law – akin to the measures 
 
34
 [Hermann] Mosler, “Der Konflikt über die gerichtiliche Nachprüfung der Verordnungen der 
Generalsekretäre in den belgischen Ministerien”, ZaöRV 1943, p. 612-613. 
35
 Mark van den Wijngaert, Het beleid van het comité van de secretarissen-generaal in België 
tijdens de Duitse bezetting 1940-1944, Brussels, 1975, p. 28-31. See also J.N.M.E. Michielsen, 
op.cit., p. 10-12. 
36
 The Germans recognized this: Mosler, “Der Konflikt…”, p. 617. 
37
 See Cour de Cassation 7 April 1941, cited in AD, suppl. volume 1919-1942, case 151 and 
other cases cited there, and the full text in Pasicrisie Belge, 1941, I, p. 136 ff. J.N.M.E. 
Michielsen, op.cit., p. 52-53. 
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that gave rise to the Dutch decision in the Judicial Review Case38. Although 
the decree precluded recourse to the Cour de Cassation, the Court did not 
recognise this, arguing the preclusion was alien to the subject and purpose of 
the decree, thus declaring itself competent to hear the case and review the 
decree. Although it upheld the decree, the Court’s decision recognized 
Belgian courts’ power of review. The possibility of constitutional review thus 
permitted the lower courts to let certain economic crimes go unpunished and 
to render several newly created economic institutions legally non-existent. On 
30 May 1942, 2,000 such cases were already pending in Belgian courts, 
according to the chief of the Military administration, Dr. Eggert Reeder39. 
Either he exaggerated or the number had increased enormously in a very short 
time, for only two weeks earlier the collaborating law review Het 
Juristenblad, the same review that later published Reeder’s speech, mentioned 
only “dozens” of cases40. 
The German occupier argued that it would be a violation of its duties under 
the Hague Convention to let this pass: public order and public life were 
threatened by this sabotage of the economic legislation. For this reason the 
German military administration issued a decree on 14 May 1942 proscribing 
judicial review of the secretaries-general’s decrees41. The previous month, the 
occupying forces had already shown their discontent by arresting two judges 
from separate courts that had reviewed and invalidated some of those decrees. 
Neither survived the war. In addition, several attorneys were arrested who 
represented parties contesting the validity of the secretaries-general’s decrees. 
The Cour de Cassation protested and called on the Belgian courts not to apply 
any penal measures included in decrees promulgated by the secretaries-
general. Threats of more arrests, executions, and deportations of judges were 
made by the German military. Several members of the Cour de Cassation 
were arrested for organizing a strike fund42. 
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These events led the Secretary-General of Justice Gaston Schuind to intervene 
and try to resolve the conflict between the Germans and the Cour de 
Cassation. Schuind argued that HR Article 43, together with pre-war 
legislation that ordered government officials and judges to remain in office 
during war-time, necessitated the judiciary to let the secretaries-general do 
their job in securing public order and public life. This was, moreover, in the 
interest of the Belgian people’s well-being, which was to be considered “the 
highest law of the land”. Schuind proposed a compromise to which the Cour 
de Cassation initially agreed. From then on, the secretaries-general’s decrees 
would be based on the statute of 7 September 1939 on the King’s special 
powers, instead of on the delegation statute. The secretaries-general would be 
regarded as acting on the King’s behalf, acquiring the competency to regulate 
various matters of public order and public life in war-time. Decrees based on 
this statute could not be reviewed, according to Schuind, although this is 
highly contestable, as it is also highly contestable that the statute on the 
King’s special powers could be used as a basis for the secretaries-general’s 
decrees. Nevertheless, this way the secretaries-general would not have to fear 
the effect of their legislation, and thus public order, being compromised by the 
anti-German sentiments of the courts. For the courts, the advantage was that 
now the ban on judicial review was no longer based on a German decree, but 
on Belgian law43. 
The Cour de Cassation, however, decided to retain for the Belgian judiciary a 
certain power of review: the courts could still invalidate the secretaries-
general’s decrees when they effectively altered the political order or gave new 
institutions the power to apply penal sanctions. Finally, after further pressure 
from the occupier, the Court consented to abandoning the power of judicial 
review concerning decrees issued on the basis of the statute on the King’s 
special powers, and the military administration suspended its ban on the 
review of the secretaries-general’s decrees44. New economic criminal 
legislation was issued on the basis of the statute on the King’s special powers, 
and the judicial crisis seemed to have ended. This compromise was called “the 
Pact”. Critics, however, regarded it as a “Pact with the devil” or even 
“downright capitulation”45. 
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Later that same year, the Secretary-General for the Interior, Gerard Romsée, 
designed decrees creating larger administrative entities centred around several 
major Belgian cities, starting with Antwerp. He based this first decree not on 
the statute on the King’s special powers, but on the delegation statute, thus 
leaving room for judicial review, which the Cour de Cassation had not given 
up for decrees based on the latter statute. Towards the end of 1942, the 
military administration ordered several courts to suspend proceedings 
concerning this decree for two months, because they feared it would be 
reviewed, and disqualified, as it obviously altered the political organisation of 
the country and thus was contrary to Belgian law and the Belgian 
Constitution. On 11 December 1942, before the two-month suspension period 
was over46, the Brussels Cour d’appel (appeal court) ruled as the occupier had 
feared. Publications of and regarding the judgement were censored47. In the 
collaborating law review Het Juristenblad, its publication was introduced by 
the editors as “proof of the ‘unreality’ which some magistrates advocate”48. 
The judges responsible were arrested immediately and held hostage together 
with several other judges and lawyers. As a protest numerous courts and 
lawyers went on strike, which was in turn outlawed by the military 
administration with reference to its task of maintaining public order and 
public life. After mediation by the Secretary-General of Justice, the Cour de 
Cassation and other courts resumed their work and eventually the Cour 
d’Appel judges were released.  
Again, the Germans sought to regulate the validity of the secretaries-general’s 
decrees. They issued a decree ordering the courts to apply and not to review 
the decree concerning the administrative reform of various municipalities. 
Nevertheless, less than a week after confirming the Pact, the Cour de 
Cassation ruled on 1 February 1943 (in a judgement that has been called the 
“Belgian Toetsingsarrest”49) that the latter decree was contrary to the statute 
on delegation and other Belgian laws50. But the court did give “factual effect” 
to the decree because of “force majeure”, resulting in letting the municipality 
of Antwerp represent one of its formerly neighbouring municipalities that had 
been incorporated by “Greater Antwerp” on the basis of the decree.  
 
46
 That the court did not respect this period was probably due to a (deliberate?) mistranslation 
of the order. J.N.M.E. Michielsen, op.cit., p. 77. 
47
 According to the Abschlussbericht der Militärverwaltung. J.N.M.E. Michielsen, op.cit., 
p. 73-74.  
48
 Het Juristenblad, (Vol. 3) 1943, column 745-748. 
49
 P.C. Kop, Slachtoffers van het Duitsche geweld: de gedenkplaten in het Paleis van Justitie, 
Amsterdam, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 1995, p. 22 note 4. 
50
 Cass. 1 février 1943, Pasicrisie Belge 1943, I, 44 ff. 
THE JUDGE, THE OCCUPIER, HIS LAWS AND THEIR VALIDITY 
216 
The Cour de Cassation was very dissatisfied with this outcome, and decided 
to write and make public a letter of protest to the German authorities, dating 
from 20 March 1943. In this letter the Court condemned the unjust measures 
by the occupation regime because they were contrary not only to the Hague 
Regulations, but also to “the overriding duties of conscience”51. It earned the 
Court great respect in the Netherlands, where a similar gesture from the Hoge 
Raad was craved in vain. After the war, Cour de Cassation president Jamar 
was awarded the Civilian Cross first class. In the eyes of later Belgian 
historians, however, Belgian judges were “not so heroic pragmatists” who 
opted for the “lesser evil” and in effect “capitulated”52. 
The Norwegian Høyesterett 
Although information about the occupier and the judiciary in Belgium and the 
Netherlands was available in both countries, the Norwegian situation 
remained largely unknown in Holland and Belgium until after the liberation. 
The Norwegian Høyesterett played a much greater, though short, political role 
from the beginning of the occupation53. On the night of the German invasion, 
a collaborating indigenous government was set up by Vidkun Quisling, who 
did not have much authority with the Norwegian people and initially did not 
get any formal support from the German occupier. Several days later, the 
Høyesterett and especially its president Paal Berg, initiated the setup of an 
Administrative Council, designed to govern the occupied parts of Norway in 
the absence of the King and the ministers who had fled to the unoccupied 
north. Also, this Council was an instrument to oust Quisling’s unpopular Nazi 
government. Berg succeeded in acquiring the consent of the German occupier 
with this plan, but was forced to agree to thank Quisling for “taking his 
responsibility as a patriot” in a radio speech.  
In June the King and the government left the country to join the Dutch and 
Belgian governments in exile in London, and the army surrendered to the 
Germans. By then, Hitler had appointed Josef Terboven as the Norwegian 
Reichskommissar, who now demanded the formal abdication of the King and 
the replacement of the lawful government and the Administrative Council by 
a State Council. At this early stage, the relation between Berg and the other 
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justices was not without friction: in negotiating with the authorities, he 
sometimes acted more as a private person than as a representative of the 
whole Høyesterett. This was also the case with Berg’s endorsement of a plan 
to persuade the king to abdicate, as demanded by the German authorities. The 
King’s refusal to step down became an important symbol of Norwegian 
resistance and the Høyesterett was unable to save the Administrative Council. 
Taken together with Berg’s public praise for Quisling and the lack of unity 
amongst the justices, these were not the ingredients for the Høyesterett 
gaining a heroic reputation of. Yet that was exactly the outcome at the end of 
1940. 
Terboven deposed the King, dismissed the government, and appointed his 
own ministers. Unlike the situation in the Netherlands and Belgium, in 
Norway there was no legal transfer of legislative authority to the highest 
remaining civil servants in the ministries. The Høyesterett discussed the 
constitutional situation and concluded that Norwegian courts were obligated 
to review measures of the occupier against the rules and principles of 
international law. Not much later, the justices would have the opportunity to 
act on this opinion. 
On 14 November 1940, the collaborating Minister of Justice, Sverre Riisnæs, 
issued a decree abolishing the system of lay participation in the judiciary. Lay 
judges and other lay participants were no longer to be chosen in elections, but 
appointed by the minister himself, and in some proceedings they could not act 
at all. The Høyesterett wrote to him that this ran contrary to the Norwegian 
justice system and to the Hague Regulations. Riisnæs did not accept this 
criticism. One of the justices was even arrested, although the exact reasons 
were unclear. Only weeks later, the Høyesterett was secretly informed of a 
letter Terboven was planning to send the justices, banning them from 
reviewing any government ordinances. The same source also announced a 
lowering of judges’ retirement age from 70 to 65 by Minister Riisnæs. The 
following year, similar measures were taken in Belgium and the Netherlands, 
but only in the Netherlands did they take effect on the courts54. The objective 
of these ordinances was of course to make room for more loyal judges. The 
justices invited Riisnæs to a meeting, but instead the aforementioned letter 
from Terboven arrived, also prohibiting the Høyesterett to take any stand in 
this matter. On 12 December, the justices sent in their letter of resignation. 
They emphasized the constitutional duty of the courts to review all legislation, 
even during an enemy occupation. Consequently, they could do nothing but 
resign. Terboven wanted to arrest the justices immediately, but Riisnæs 
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convinced him not to, and tried to reopen negotiations. Predictably, however, 
the Høyesterett was not to be persuaded. The Minister then argued that in the 
present circumstances the judges were not the ones in power, to which 
president Berg retorted: “But the moral power lies with the judge”. On the last 
working day before Christmas, 21 December 1940, the Høyesterett 
collectively, unanimously, and openly left their offices, not to return until 
after Norway’s liberation in 1945. This action, according to Norwegian 
collective memory, “stands out for posterity as the most vital and far-reaching 
in the history of the Supreme Court”55. All justices were left unharmed by the 
Germans for the remainder of the occupation, even though President Paal 
Berg went on to become the leader of the Norwegian resistance. 
A new supreme court was created by the occupation government, called the 
kommissariske høyesterett (Commissary Supreme Court, CSC), to which only 
loyal collaborators were appointed56. Justice Minister Riisnæs even found two 
anti-Nazi lawyers who supported his view that there was a sound legal basis 
for a supreme court without the power of judicial review. Only two of the new 
justices were real ideologues, the others having to be persuaded to become 
members of the CSC. Nonetheless, their judgements do not seem to have 
deviated much from the lines set out by the Høyesterett. The new court, at 
first, even ruled against the state in a number of criminal cases regarding 
violations of the occupier’s decrees. Unlike the situation in the Netherlands, 
where the Dutch National Socialist Movement succeeded in having members 
and political allies appointed in many of the courts57, the Norwegian 
occupation regime did not appoint any like-minded jurists to positions in the 
lower courts. In Belgium hardly any Nazis were appointed judge either58. The 
most striking change was the sharp decline in the number of civil cases. This 
was probably due to the fact that parties in litigation distrusted or politically 
opposed the collaborating justices, or feared that their judgements would all 
be annulled upon liberation. Apparently, the public prosecutor did not share 
those sentiments, as the number of criminal cases stayed the same. The ratio 
of civil and criminal cases changed from 10:7 to 1:2. The CSC gradually grew 
more rigorous. 
One verdict by the CSC stands out: the Norwegian Judicial Review Case59. 
This case, which was pending when the Høyesterett resigned, was termed a 
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“farewell present” from the Høyesterett to the new justices, because it forced 
the CSC to rule on their own constitutional position. Again, as in the Dutch 
and Belgian judicial review controversies, the case centred around measures 
intended to improve food distribution and reduce economic crime. The 
appellant had been convicted for violation of price prescriptions by a court 
lacking lay judges. The occupier’s decree abolishing lay judges in these 
proceedings was, in his view, contrary to HR Article 43. Much like the Dutch 
case a year later, the Norwegian public prosecutor argued that the decree did 
not violate HR Article 43, because it had been proposed by the national price 
authorities themselves, and that it was absolutely necessary. The CSC did not 
agree. It stated that Norwegian judges could not review any of the occupier’s 
decrees. The duty to review the validity of relevant law should not be 
extended to international legal relations. The only competent organ to assess 
compliance with the Hague Regulations was the occupation regime itself. If 
the courts were to have the power of review, they might interfere in a sphere 
where they lacked expertise: the sphere of the executive power, which was 
responsible for protecting public order and civil life. So reviewing the 
occupier’s ordinances would in effect harm public order and civil life instead 
of helping to protect it. The German authorities were so pleased with this 
important decision that they had it published in a brochure under the title The 
Høyesterett renders a judgement of historical importance60. Contrary to the 
Dutch Hoge Raad, the CSC did, however, leave some room for judicial 
review: it would be acceptable only with regard to ordinances that obviously 
transcended “the bounds of a reasonable observation of [executive] duties”.  
In 1943, the Aker District Court decided to make explicit use of this 
reservation61. A man called Peter Øverland left his farm to an agricultural 
society. One of his descendants challenged the will after Øverland had died. 
He tried to acquire the farm, arguing that there existed an old allodial 
privilege in Norwegian customary law that was aimed at keeping land in the 
same family, which would grant him ownership rights. He succeeded, upon 
which the agricultural society protested with the help of the collaborationist 
Norwegian authorities. They promptly issued an ordinance that reversed the 
previous decision, granting right of ownership to the society. The heir went to 
court, demanding the farm back on the grounds of the ordinance’s violation of 
HR Article 43. The court agreed with him, considering itself competent to 
review the decree, because of it was “obviously in contradiction to Article 43 
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of the Hague Regulations”. Abrogation of the allodial law by the occupier was 
judged unnecessary to fulfil his duty to “re-establish and ensure public order 
and safety”.  
The German occupation caused a major shift in the reputation of the 
Høyesterett. Before the war, it was regarded as a somewhat old-fashioned 
institution that, in reviewing legislation, favoured certain social classes over 
others62. After resigning, the Høyesterett acquired a mythical standing as 
resistance heroes and representatives of all Norwegians, and it has not lost this 
reputation since. The post-war Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry 
concluded that “[t]he Supreme Court deserves the gratitude of the people”63. 
Only one incident reminds us of the fact that things could have turned out 
very differently: after Paal Berg’s retirement, one of his former colleagues in 
the Høyesterett demanded that an official investigation be conducted by the 
Court of Impeachment into his conduct during the war. This demand was 
mainly fuelled by irritation with Berg’s autonomous deliberations with the 
enemy. It did not harm his public image, however.  
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Table 1 
The courts’ actions and justifications and the occupier’s measures, in correlation with the 
courts’ reputations. 
Actions, justifications and the public eye 
An interesting relation that should be researched more thoroughly (and in 
more occupations) exists between, on the one hand, the actions of the supreme 
courts, the way they justified themselves and the occupier’s measures against 
them, and, on the other hand, the public opinion of those courts, as presented 
in Table 1. This relation is illustrated by the professional dilemma that 
generally haunts civil servants and judges under enemy rule64. The dilemma 
was: either to remain in office to try and make the best of a bad situation – but 
in the meantime being forced to cooperate with the ever more repressive 
occupier, thus dirtying one’s hands, or to resign (or risk dismissal for non-
loyal behaviour or resistance activities), thereby publicly showing criticism 
against the occupier and preventing the stigma of collaboration – but at the 
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Hoge Raad Cour de Cassation Høyesterett
Protest + + +
Public protest - + +
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+ + -
Review - + +
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Positivism + + +
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Illegal 
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opinion
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same time making room for a collaborationist who might make things worse 
for all concerned65. (In some respects this position may be comparable to the 
position of the manager of a restaurant owned by a criminal who frustrates the 
manager’s attempts to run a decent business.) The Dutch Hoge Raad 
identified strongly with the first option, the “lesser evil”, dirtying its hands to 
prevent what was expected to be the greater evil – replacement by 
collaborationists. It is not evident, however, that the latter really was a greater 
evil. In their defence pamphlet, the Hoge Raad stated that without them, 
people would stop paying their debts. After the Høyesterett’s resignation, no 
legal chaos ensued and the German repression did not get worse because of it.  
The Hoge Raad acted pragmatically for what it considered the benefit of the 
people: legal certainty and protection of rights. As part of this cautious 
strategy it did not allow any of its own criticism of the occupier to be made 
public. The court further justified its attitude by referring to pre-war 
government instructions to all government personnel to remain in office as 
long as possible and to abide by the letter of the law concerning judicial 
review. This amounts to a legal positivist stance: the validity of legal rules is 
believed to be determined by procedural criteria and not by moral norms. Put 
crudely, positivist arguments for a legal decision have the form “because it is 
the law”. This did not appeal to the imagination of the resistance or anyone 
else. 
The Belgian Cour de Cassation and the Norwegian Høyesterett also used 
positivist arguments in their protests, only natural for a court of law, 
especially in civil law countries. They argued, for example, that judicial 
review was their constitutional right and duty. However, contrary to the Hoge 
Raad, they also made use of natural law arguments and showed their 
indignation publicly. Natural law theory is often portrayed as the counterpart 
of legal positivism, because it does consider moral norms (natural law) to be 
relevant criteria for the validity of legal rules. In the letter that was made 
public, the Cour de Cassation called the German policies contrary to “the 
overriding duties of conscience” and Paal Berg explicitly invoked the “moral 
power” of the judge, which was publicly displayed in the court’s resignation. 
This combination of public protest and moral or natural law critique seems to 
be an import prerequisite of public approval.  
A metaphor that was applicable only to the Dutch and Belgian situation is that 
of the fyke net. At the start of the occupation, things did not seem that bad and 
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cooperation seemed the obvious and reasonable option. A few years later, 
however, the courts discovered that they had swum into a fyke net and were 
now stuck in a situation they had not foreseen. This danger did not materialize 
in Norway, because the Høyesterett had recognized the danger early on and 
refused to even enter the net. Therefore, they could not become implicated in 
the occupier’s policies by cooperating in their execution. This may account 
for the difference in public appreciation of the Supreme Courts’ roles in 
Belgium and Norway, although both courts made public and moral protests 
and retained the right of judicial review. The Cour de Cassation’s dirtying of 
its hands has been described as a “pact with the devil” and as “not so heroic 
pragmatism”. 
A final but important factor in the Supreme Courts’ resistance potential is the 
presidency. In the Netherlands, organising protest was severely frustrated by 
the new president’s loyalty to the occupier, and by the appointments of other 
loyal collaborators. In Belgium and Norway, on the other hand, the presidents 
were not replaced and played important roles in opposing the occupier’s 
policies. 
Conclusion 
The attitude of each Supreme Court towards judicial review appears to 
contain all or most of the important factors determining the public image they 
acquired: the Hoge Raad on its own initiative rejected the power of review to 
avoid friction with the occupation regime, and did not step down, which 
contributed to a negative public image. The Cour de Cassation did review, 
but was pressured into giving factual effect to illegal legislation, and did not 
resign, which led to less fierce criticism, but by no means an unblemished 
reputation. The Høyesterett explicitly reserved the right of judicial review and 
stepped down because of the occupier’s demand that that right be abandoned. 
This earned the court a lasting image of war heroes. 
Although it cannot be demonstrated, even with hindsight, that any one of the 
possible attitudes was more to the benefit of the population during the 
occupation than the other, it is clear that after liberation judges and courts 
who had “accommodated” to the enemy were put in a bad frame – even when 
they had protested against injustices. A stance of unwavering patriotism was 
sure to buy much more credit. In the end, in all three countries, the need for a 
principled, patriotic, and public stand against injustice was more strongly felt 
than the necessity of concealed pragmatics for the material wellbeing of the 
people. 
